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The IMF to the Rescue: Did the Euro Area benefit from the 
Fund’s Experience in Crisis fighting? 
 




The paper analyses how the IMF brought its experience gained in emerging market sovereign 
debt crises in the troika’s handling of the euro crisis. We link models of multiple equilibria 
with the IMF’s experience made in Latin American crises in the 2000s. We examine 
subsequent changes in the IMF’s policy guidelines and show that previous insights have been 
taken in, but applied only with a significant delay and partially against institutional rules and 
internal advice for the case of Greece. Hence, we argue that the inclusion of the IMF in 
Europe’s crisis fighting did not completely deliver what had been hoped for. 
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The euro crisis has brought enormous changes: not only has the European Monetary Union 
overhauled its governance structure and centralised banking supervision, but the crisis has 
also marked a sea change for the global monetary system. Having lost most of its borrowing 
clients prior to the crisis of 2008/9, the IMF gained a new role: not only has it been asked to 
put together a number of large rescue packages, but it has also been called in to support 
advanced economies in Europe for the first time since 1977.  
Moreover, the IMF’s inclusion in the bail-out packages in Greece, Portugal and Ireland was 
very peculiar for the motivation of the borrowing countries: for the Europeans, it was not 
primarily the need for funds that led them to ask the IMF to participate in their troika setup 
(also including the European Commission and the European Central Bank, ECB), but rather 
the idea to draw upon the IMF’s wide experience in designing and implementing rescue 
packages and adjustment programmes in times of crisis (Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff 2013).  
In policy circles, this decision has widely been defended and seen as a success. As the former 
ECB director Jörg Asmussen put it: “It proved right to bring in the IMF. The Fund has unique 
experience in the design of such programmes. It additionally is a kind of external policeman 
in Europe who may be able to act with less consideration” (Asmussen 2012).5 
In this paper, we ask how the IMF brought in such unique experience from assisting 
economically less advanced economies. In answering this question, we analyse three aspects. 
First, given the theoretical knowledge about financial crises such as the one in the euro area, 
what would have been ideal design elements of a resolution approach? Second, to what extent 
did the IMF incorporate these elements in emerging market programmes in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s and how were IMF policy guidelines redesigned? Third, to what extent did the 
IMF manage to transfer this experience to the euro crisis? We analyse these questions by 
deducing crucial insights for the management of liquidity and solvency crises from three 
generations of economic crisis literature and comparing such knowledge with the IMF’s 
policy frameworks and applied approaches in emerging markets and Europe. In doing so, we 
do not aim to inquire about the institutional changes or decision-making processes inside the 
IMF that may have contributed to policy changes, nor do we analyse policy conditionality in 
detail. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the second section, we briefly review 
the development of theoretical models on financial crises and summarise what the ideal policy 
conclusions from these models are regarding rescue loans and adjustment packages. In the 
third section, we compare these policy conclusions with the IMF’s policy stance in the most 
prominent emerging market crises of the past two decades, namely the Argentinian crisis of 
2001/2 and the Brazilian crisis of 2002, as well as exploring the insights that the IMF has 
explicitly drawn from its experiences in these crises. In the fourth section, we subsequently 
                                               
5 Original quote: „Es war richtig, den IWF zu beteiligen. Der Fonds hat eine einmalige Erfahrung im Entwerfen 
solcher Programme. Er ist zudem wie ein externer Polizist in Europa, der weniger Rücksichten nehmen muss“, 
(Interview FTD 20.2.2012).  
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contrast the new policy guidelines based on the IMF’s insights from emerging market crises 
with the approach taken by the troika when dealing with the euro zone countries. 
Liquidity vs. Solvency Problems and three Generations of theorising Financial Crises 
The increased turmoil in financial markets since the break-down of the Bretton Woods system 
in the 1970s has stimulated interest in theorising financial crisis events, resulting in the 
development of several generations of models for balance-of-payment crises during the 1980s 
and 1990s. While it is still debated which types of crises (fiscal, banking, competitiveness, 
etc.) have interacted in the euro area (Shambaugh 2012; Fratzscher 2013) and the 
classification of past emerging market crisis is far from trivial (Kaminsky and Reinhart1999 
or Laeven and Valencia 2012), some lessons from these models can be applied regardless 
which crisis elements were actually relevant in the euro crisis.  
Central to the models of balance-of-payment crises is the idea that there is a limited stock of 
an asset (foreign reserves in the case of pure balance-of-payment crisis, and government 
revenue in the case of sovereign debt crises), which is depleted by either policy errors or 
investors’ flight, or a combination of both. 
The first generation of models explains attacks on a currency with a fixed exchange rate by 
rational expectations, due to inconsistent government policies or flight out of public bonds, 
thus making public debt unsustainable. For example, when a fiscal deficit raises domestic 
inflation above the international level, capital outflows will force the monetary authority to 
give up a fixed exchange rate (Krugman 1979). Interestingly, the capital flight here sets in 
before currency reserves are exhausted, when investors expect that the path of reserve losses 
is on an unsustainable path. 
Translated to the question of sovereign debt, this model can explain that a fiscal policy putting 
a country into a position where it will be unable to service its debt in the future would lead 
investors to stop financing budget deficits already today, hence forcing a government to 
default. Since the cause of the default in this situation is an unsustainable fiscal stance, an 
adjustment programme requires a change of existing policies through what is generally known 
as austerity, namely expenditure cuts and revenue increases. In fact, this adjustment is the 
most important element of crisis fighting as only such an adjustment can bring countries back 
to a sustainable path. In addition, if no adjustment path is perceivable because the existing 
debt stock is already too high, adjustment has to be implemented in combination with a debt 
restructuring. Liquidity loans can be given to limit the fallout to the real economy. 
The mechanism is different in second-generation models (i.e. Obstfeld 1996), which do not 
necessarily assume such a clear-cut policy failure as the starting point. While countries 
running a clearly unsustainable monetary or fiscal policy will find themselves in a crisis just 
as in the first-generation models, the second-generation models additionally include the 
possibility of multiple equilibria for countries with economic policies that are not clearly 
unsustainable. As Cole and Kehoe (1996) have shown, this setup leads to the possibility of a 
self-fulfilling debt or fiscal crisis. The logic here is simple: for an entity with a moderate, yet 
not extremely high, level of debt whether it is able to service its debt depends on the 
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expectations of market participants. If investors believe that a country in debt is able to 
service their claims, they accept lower interest rates and the debt may thus be sustainable. In 
the case of a sovereign debtor, if investors believe that the state in question might be unable to 
service the debt, they demand higher interest rates and the debt becomes unbearable, thus 
leading to a default.  
As a shift in expectations can trigger a crisis in these models even without a change in 
underlying fundamentals, it is difficult to point out one specific reason for a crisis to occur 
(Krugman 1999).  
The catch in these models is that if a third party can guarantee continued access to loans at 
sensible interest rates, expectations will permanently stabilise in the “good” equilibrium and a 
self-fulfilling fiscal crisis is thus no longer possible. The action of this third party would help 
in the avoidance of huge costs for the economy in case of successful crisis prevention. The 
need for macroeconomic adjustment programmes is much less clear under such a self-
fulfilling crisis than under the standard crisis in the first-generation models: of course, a lower 
debt-to-GDP ratio might make crises less likely, yet, as expectations might have triggered the 
crisis, they are no necessary condition for solving the crisis. As in some cases, austerity can 
actually lower GDP in a way that the debt-to-GDP level actually increases (Holland and 
Portes 2012); accordingly, such programmes should be designed with caution. 
Third-generation models of currency crises (Chang and Velasco 2000; Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini 1998; Krugman 2003) have subsequently explored how problems in the banking and 
financial system interact with public debt and currency crises, as well as how they mutually 
reinforce themselves, signalling the relevance of smooth and decisive action to stop these 
crises from spilling over to the real sector and other countries.  
There are two main concerns about the aforementioned liquidity provision by a third, external 
actor to stop a self-fulfilling crisis to realise: first, this third party has to be available and 
capable of providing liquidity in a sufficient amount to turn market expectations; and second, 
it has to make a clear distinction between a situation of illiquidity and insolvency.  
Regarding the first point of liquidity provision, in the case of a domestic banking system with 
financial contracts denominated in domestic currency, a central bank that is able to act as 
lender of last resort (LLR) usually exists, as it can emit liquidity in domestic currency without 
limits. The relevance of a LLR for ensuring monetary and financial stability at the domestic 
level has been known since the seminal work of Bagehot on the emergence of the Bank of 
England as the first central bank in the modern world (Bagehot 1873). 
Nonetheless, liquidity provision is less simple both in the case of debt denominated in foreign 
currency and for public debt, and particularly for the euro area. First, for the case of foreign 
currency-denominated external debt, the domestic central bank is unable to serve as LLR, as it 
cannot emit foreign currency. The major non-market access to financing is liquidity provision 
by the IMF, since there is no LLR at the global level (Eichengreen and Hausmann 2005). 
Second, for the case of a public debtor under stress, there is disagreement concerning the 
question of whether a central bank should act as LLR, or if this would undermine the main 
task of a central bank to maintain price stability and create moral hazard on the side of 
5 
 
governments to overspend and expect a central bank bail-out. Overall, the guiding principles 
of central banking are shifting away from a narrow orientation to price stability, towards 
achieving the overall goal of financial stability (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010; 
Eichengreen et al. 2011). However, one issue of great debate is whether this includes clearly 
defined efforts to maintain the liquidity of national governments to restore the “good 
equilibrium” even though dominant market expectations may indicate otherwise (Eichengreen 
et al. 2011, 24; see also Blanchard 2012). Finally, for the euro area, liquidity provision to 
national governments through the ECB is constrained by the EU treaties’ rules, which prohibit 
the direct purchase of government bonds as well as the provision of overdraft facilities. In this 
respect, the euro area’s national governments’ outstanding debt has features of foreign 
currency-denominated debt.6 
Second, it is key for the third actor to distinguish between problems of liquidity and solvency. 
Insolvent entities are defined as being unable to serve their obligations in the medium and 
long term, even if provided with additional short-term liquidity. Providing liquidity for an 
insolvent entity thus means that the postponement of the insolvency leads to increased costs.  
For both cases, conditionality has to be tackled in a case-specific manner. In first generation 
types of crises, liquidity provision or debt restructuring necessarily has to be conditioned 
towards fiscal adjustment. For second-generation financial crisis events, a careful analysis is 
needed whether the investors’ panic has been caused by policies that have moved the country 
closer to an unsustainable financial path, such as structural weaknesses or inadequate financial 
regulation, or whether the panic has been triggered mostly by external events. Thus, within 
these models, policy conditionality needs to be tailored towards country-specific conditions, 
and conditionality cannot substitute for debt reduction in case of an insolvent sovereign 
debtor. Thereby, creditors may also be able to tackle, at least to a certain degree, the problem 
of lacking ownership of reform measures by the debtor (Bird/Willett 2004), which might ease 
the problem of ‘straitjacketing the state’ in delivering public services (Clifton 2014).   
How the IMF brought in the Distinction between Liquidity and Solvency Crisis 
These theoretical developments did not leave the IMF untouched; rather, especially the 
emerging market crises of the 1990s left the IMF exposed to harsh criticism concerning its 
handling of crises (e.g. Stiglitz 2002) and it became increasingly clear that the Fund faces a 
threefold theoretical, managerial and financial challenge, to which it reacted with a revision of 
major approaches and policies. 
From a theoretical perspective, it was a challenge that most of these currency crises occurred 
in a context of market-friendly reforms, especially regarding trade and financial liberalisation. 
It was rather clear that these could not easily be explained as the consequence of mere and 
crude policy failures, as in the aforementioned first-generation currency crisis models, and as 
debt and currency crises in developing countries during the 1980s had been treated in the 
context of import substitution strategies. Against this background, IMF economists quickly 
                                               
6 Albeit one can argue that this constraint has been loosened by the ECB’s announcement of the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) policies under which the ECB is now allowed to buy government bonds of 
countries being subject to an ESM program. 
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started to reflect the relevance of multiple equilibria models for this new type of crisis. For 
instance, in an IMF working paper, Flood and Marion (1996) directly linked these models to 
the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 (see also Masson 1999). These reflections not only regarded 
exchange rate issues, but also the question of the conditions under which the IMF should act 
as a third actor injecting liquidity to re-establish the “good equilibrium” within market 
expectations.  
Not last due to the experience in Argentina where the Fund received heavy critique for its 
intervention (see part 3.1), the institution started to develop a clear-cut framework to 
distinguish between illiquid and insolvent entities in terms of intervention in capital account 
and currency crises, taking on board the above-discussed theoretical insights. In a 
programmatic paper based on the “Prague Framework” (Köhler 2000), the IMF established a 
new guideline in which the IMF should systematically differentiate: liquidity crises should be 
solved by the rapid and sufficient provision of liquidity, while solvency problems should be 
tackled by debt restructuring, which may not only involve the lengthening of maturities, but 
also a haircut in terms of reducing the face value of debt.  
In a subsequent institutional guideline titled “Assessing Sustainability” (IMF 2002a), the IMF 
delivered an operational definition of the concepts of liquidity and solvency:  
“An entity is solvent if the present discounted value (PDV) of its current and 
future primary expenditure is no greater than the PDV of its current and future 
path of income, net of any initial indebtedness. […] An entity is illiquid if, 
regardless of whether it satisfies the solvency condition, its liquid assets and 
available financing are insufficient to meet or roll over its maturing liabilities”, 
(IMF 2002a: 5)  
In the very same document, the IMF recognised that the distinction between liquidity and 
solvency crisis is rather vague. First, these concepts in fact are blurring: unless solved 
immediately, a liquidity crisis will lead to rising financing costs and thus an increase in the 
present value of debt. Therefore, the IMF started applying the concept of debt sustainability, 
which means compliance with both liquidity and solvency criteria: “Sustainability thus 
incorporates the concepts of solvency and liquidity, without making a sharp demarcation 
between them”, (IMF 2002a, 4). Second, it was acknowledged that this concept was far from 
easy to empirically assess. The present value of debt and debt service are mainly determined 
by macroeconomic parameters such as the interest rate and the growth rate, and - in the case 
of emerging markets - the exchange rate, which by definition is endogenous to market 
expectations on the liquidity and solvency status of the debtor. The IMF concluded that 
“assessments of sustainability are thus inherently probabilistic and no framework can dispense 
with their need for making judgements”, (IMF 2002a, 6).  
Moreover, owing to financial deregulation, private international capital flows had grown 
strongly until the early 2000s. Thus, the hitherto applied IMF quota (based on a country’s 
share in the IMF) that determined the volume of liquidity that a country may draw from the 
institution was deemed to be insufficient by far. In the end of 2002, the IMF hence established 
the “Exceptional Access Policy” (EAP), to be applied to: “any lending in which access is 
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above 100 per cent of quota on an annual basis or above 300 per cent of quota cumulative 
irrespective of the facility used”, (IMF 2003a, 5).  
Based on the considerations about liquidity and solvency issues, this access to large funds was 
linked to exceptionally strict rules (IMF 2003a, 3–4): First, it should be applied only to 
exceptional balance of payments pressures; second, and most important, “[a] rigorous and 
systematic analysis [should indicate] that there is a high probability that debt will remain 
sustainable”, (IMF 2003a, 4; highlight by the authors); third, the country should have good 
prospects of regaining access to private capital markets; and fourth, liquidity provision should 
be backed by a strong programme design and implementation in terms of adjustment policies. 
The rather successful credit package to Brazil in 2002 was seen as a justification for the 
increase in potential lending capacity by the IMF. In a 2006 seminar titled “Who Needs the 
IMF?”, Kenneth Rogoff labelled the IMF's assistance to Brazil in 2002 as a major turning 
point in this period: 
“Consider, for example, the Fund's risky and creative lending package to Brazil in 
August 2002 (…). With market access suddenly freezing up and the country on 
the brink of default, the Fund stepped in with $30 billion. The Fund's loan 
arguably helped avert a meltdown that would have slammed global markets from 
Manila to Istanbul, and forestalled the benign period that emerging market 
economies have enjoyed the past few years”, (Rogoff 2006). 
The insights that the IMF took away from these crisis experiences can thus be summarised in 
three points: first, make an assessment whether there is a liquidity or a solvency problem, 
whereby loans should only be made if there is a liquidity problem; second, if there is a 
liquidity problem, stand-by arrangements should be large enough to dispel any doubts about 
its volume’s sufficiency; and third, only ask for policy adjustments if and as much they are 
necessary for regaining market access. 
A historical analysis of the principles and guidelines of the Fund show that since its 
foundation, “the concepts, analytical framework, techniques, and methodologies that the Fund 
staff has developed over the years have almost always evolved out of an immediate practical 
problem that a member faced”, (De Vries 1987, 16).  
Based on IMF documents on the cases of Argentina and Brazil, we first argue that the 
experiences sketched out in this section had relevant roots in the Argentinian crises of the 
early 2000s and the Fund’s highly criticised involvement (see part 3.1). Second, we interpret 
the case of swift liquidity provision for Brazil in 2002 (part 3.2) as an immediate application 
of the newly gained insights. What other authors confirm for the 2010s, namely that the IMF 
is not what it used to be (Ban and Gallagher 2015), we already find for this earlier period. 
 
Argentina 
The IMF had been involved in Argentina since the mid-1990s and saw itself drawn into the 
deepening crisis in the late 1990s. After the crisis, the IMF’s response in the country was seen 
as highly problematic by both the Fund itself and external observers. Hence, the IMF’s 
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involvement in Argentina led to an intensive reflection and posterior redefinition of its 
policies.  
The background of the Argentinian crisis was its currency board regime of fixed exchange 
rates, which its government had introduced in the early 1990s to fight inflation. Under this 
regime, the Argentinian central bank was only allowed to issue domestic currency in 
exchange against US dollars. Hence, it did not have the ability to conduct counter-cyclical 
policies and it was not in a position to act as a LLR in case its banks experienced liquidity 
problems.  
While this regime had managed to bring down inflation to single digits in the early 1990s and 
had increased investors’ confidence and hence capital inflows in the first part of the decade, 
from the onset of the Asian crisis the country started to experience substantial capital 
outflows. At this point, a continuing inflation differential with the United States eroded 
Argentina’s competitiveness. This problem was exacerbated by the devaluation of the 
currency of Brazil, Argentina’s most important trading partner. As the central bank could not 
create money, the capital outflows led to a severe credit contraction. 
From 1999 onwards, the Argentinian economy continuously shrank to a negative GDP growth 
of -10.9 per cent in 2002 (see table 1), losing about a quarter of its economic capacity in this 
period. This was the most severe economic crisis that a non-transition country had suffered in 
peace times since the Great Depression. The combination of falling GDP and falling tax 
revenue led to a strongly increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. At the beginning of 2002, the 
country declared default on its external debt. Debt restructuring discussions with private 
creditors were only brought to an end in 2005, where a majority of bond holders accepted 
longer maturities and haircuts of nominal debt values.7 
Between 1996 and 2001, the IMF had three financing arrangements with Argentina, one under 
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) (1998, which was classified precautionary, and of which no 
drawings were made) and two Special Borrowing Arrangements (SBA, 1996 and 2000). In 
early 2000, the IMF aimed to address the deteriorating economic situation in Argentina and 
the country’s lack of access to international financial markets with a SBA of about 7.2 billion 
USD. This package included harsh austerity: the IMF and Argentina agreed in early 2000 that 
the government would move the federal budget from a deficit of 2.5 per cent of GDP to 
balance by “2003 at the latest” (IMF 2000a). 
The SBA was raised by 13.7 billion USD in early 2001 while austerity was increased with the 
memorandum of understanding from December 2000, which now promised an increase in the 
consolidated public sector primary surplus of four percentage points from 2001 to 2005 (IMF 
2000b). In addition, the IMF steered an international financing package by public and private 
creditors: the so-called blindaje (shield) amounted to 39 billion USD (IEO 2004, 9). At the 
same time, in a last and desperate attempt, the Argentinian government conducted a broad 
                                               
7 A minority of institutional debt holders refused this agreement and appealed to US courts, which in 2014 
decided that Argentina had to fulfil its obligations, hindering the country from serving its debt with other bond 
holders that had accepted the restructuring deal. In reaction to the court decision, international rating agencies 
again declared Argentina as bankrupt, which was mirrored in non-investment grades.  
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restructuring of domestic public bonds that prolonged bond maturities and should have 
reduced public refinancing costs. However, interest rates rose in parallel and hence 
refinancing costs did not decrease. By contrast, expectations of a possible default were further 
fuelled and capital flight continued. In the autumn of 2001, the aforementioned SBA was 
augmented again to about 22 billion USD, of which 3 billion USD was supposed to support a 
possible debt restructuring intervention.  
However, the rescue package could not bring Argentina back to international financial 
markets and capital inflows did not return. The country’s payment obligations were 
enormous, fuelled by increasing risk premiums on international credits, which increased 
within 2001 from an already high level of 1000 to about 5000 basis points. Finally, by the end 
of 2001, the IMF cut off its support to Argentina due to missing compliance with the agreed 
fiscal programme and a lack of market confidence (IEO 2004, 9).  
Some voices within the IMF continued to argue that Argentina’s unsustainable fiscal policy 
had been the main problem, most prominently including Michael Mussa, head of the IMF’s 
research department until 2001 (Mussa 2002, 10–12). Had that been true, an adjustment of 
these policies should have been able to end the crisis and the IMF loans could have been seen 
as a sensible, transitory provision to ease the adjustment process. Even if public spending was 
high, this alone could not have caused a crisis of the experienced magnitude.8  
Nonetheless, there were already indications during the crisis that Argentina had more 
fundamental problems. A look at the composition of tax income and spending during the 
crisis period shows that the sharp increase of public-debt-to-GDP ratios (see table 1) was 
mainly due to increasing public debt service and a shrinking GDP, while the primary balance, 
i.e. the fiscal balance before debt service, on average showed a slight surplus of 0.45 per cent 
during this period. Public debt service increased from 10.9 per cent in 1997 to 23.4 per cent in 
2001 (Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti 2012b, 9). 
Despite the strong adjustment in the primary balance of the public sector the virtuous circle 
was never attained. Even worse, the increases in taxes and the cuts in public expenditures 
reinforced the recessionary trend, thus feeding the negative expectations that prevented 
realizing the highly anticipated fall in the country-risk premium. Fiscal policy alone was 
impotent to compensate for the strong macroeconomic imbalances, which laid somewhere 
else, i.e. in the external sector of the economy (Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti 2012a, 4).  
The major problem for Argentina in serving its debt was less its unwillingness to tolerate the 
IMF’s interventions into domestic policies, which would straightjacket the state (Clifton 
2014), but rather its rigid fixed exchange rate regime, together with overall high foreign debt. 
While the public-debt-to-GDP ratio was not overly high (see table 1), public debt was almost 
entirely in foreign currency and a depreciation would have strongly increased the debt burden. 
At the same time, Argentina was unable to generate economic growth at the (overvalued) 
                                               
8 Before the on-set of the crisis, the Argentinean primary balance noted a surplus between 1 and 2 per cent (IMF 
2003b). The overall structural budget deficit (including interest rate payments) was below 2 per cent of GDP in 
1997 and 1998. Later on, the federal primary balance worsened but improved again. Rather than by excessive 
public spending alone, economic recovery was put at risk by an extremely high real interest rate level (see table 
1). Vulnerability, not only of Argentina, but of emerging markets in general, found its expression in rising risk 
premia on Argentinean bonds. Interest rates considerably pushed the change in debt (see table 1).  
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exchange rate of the time. So, under the existing macroeconomic framework, Argentina had 
to be seen as insolvent.  
With hindsight, the IMF also seemed to have reached a similar conclusion rather early in this 
process. Flemming Larsen, then IMF Director Offices in Europe, stated in 2003: “The IMF 
should have insisted on the conclusion we reached by 1998 that the fixed exchange rate 
regime was unsustainable and that the authorities seemed either unwilling or unable to adjust 
their policies sufficiently to avoid the eventual meltdown”, (Larsen 2003). Nonetheless, he 
blames national authorities for the continuation of the IMF programmes on this unsustainable 
course: “Those concerns [of an eventual financial meltdown] were expressed repeatedly but 
the authorities refused to consider an exit from the currency board arrangement until the 
change was forced by markets” (Larsen 2003).  
A major problem can certainly be found in the rigidity of the currency board arrangement, 
which provided no orderly exit. In fact, the IMF had not been responsible for introducing this 
regime in Argentina in the beginning of the 1990s, but later strongly advocated in favour of 
this rigid version of a fixed exchange rate to stabilise market expectations within multiple 
equilibria. This rigid exchange rate peg had - among others - produced substantial 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, sustained by major capital inflows in the pre-crisis 
period. Consequently, the country had accumulated increasing current account deficits and 
external debt in foreign currency, which became unbearable and made a change of the 
currency regime without debt default all but impossible.  
However, even if the national authorities insisted on sticking with this regime, it would have 
been the IMF’s role to stop new lending to a clearly insolvent country. The IMF’s series of 
liquidity provisions in the years before the default and debt restructuring were assigned based 
on the assumption that the country was running an unstable fiscal policy that could in 
principle still be remedied by budget cuts, and they were inconsistent with its previous 
assessment of the country’s unsustainable debt levels recognised at least behind closed doors.  
Insert here: Table 1. Argentina: Selected Economic Indicators 
 
Brazil 
In contrast to its handling of the crisis in Argentina, the IMF’s crisis reaction in Brazil in 2002 
is generally seen as a success. We argue that it is linked to the rethinking of the Fund’s 
approach of crisis fighting, reflected in its new framework “Assessing Sustainability”, as well 
as the introduction of the EAP (even if it only became fully operational in February 2003).  
Here, according to the current interpretation, the IMF managed to stop a situation of 
illiquidity from transforming into insolvency by providing timely and sufficient liquidity 
provision. In line with the theoretical arguments above and the diagnosis of a mainly 
expectations-driven crisis, the IMF did not force overly harsh austerity measures on Brazil as 
part of the package. 
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In the run up to the presidential elections in October 2002, international investors’ fears about 
economic policy changes in case the leftist candidate Lula would win the elections provoked 
enormous flight out of the Brazilian currency. Behind this was a deterioration of the public-
debt-to-GDP ratio despite substantial austerity policies over the last years. Additionally, at the 
time of the presidential elections, the neighbouring country – and major trading partner - 
Argentina had just defaulted on its debt and undergone a maxi devaluation. These events 
caused contagious capital outflows. 
At that time, Brazil’s economic situation was ambiguous. On the one side, since the last 
financial crisis in 1999 and the subsequent abandoning of the pegged exchange rate regime 
together with a maxi devaluation, GDP growth had recovered in 2000, and the stock of both 
total external debt (private and public) and public debt (domestic and international) was 
moderate in relative terms. External debt stocks ranged around 40 per cent of GNI and 
government net debt was below 50 per cent of GDP in 2001 (see table 2). At the same time, 
public debt demonstrated a high vulnerability due to exchange rate indexation and because a 
large part was denominated in foreign currency. Consequently, with capital outflows and a 
depreciation of the national currency by almost 50 per cent, the public debt level increased 
relative to GDP.  
“The depreciation of the exchange rate as a result of a confidence shock in the 
run-up to the presidential election in October led to an increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio as a consequence of the revaluation of outstanding exchange rate-
indexed and foreign currency-denominated liabilities. Owing to this, and the 
concomitant monetary tightening, outlays on interest payments increased 
substantially, leading to a deterioration of the headline budget balance in 2002-03, 
despite the maintenance of a robust primary surplus”, (DeMello and Moccero 
2006, 13).  
The IMF did not classify the situation as a case of insolvency but rather as one of temporary 
illiquidity, with an associated risk of it quickly turning into one of insolvency in case of on-
going market mistrust. In July 2002, the IMF stepped in with its – at that time largest ever in 
SDR terms – loan as a stand-by arrangement of 30.4 billion USD (22.8 billion SDR) over a 
period of 15 months (see also IMF 2002b). As this amount significantly exceeded Brazil’s 
regular quota of 3.04 billion SDR at the IMF, de facto, it was a test of the EAP that was 
introduced at the IMF in September 2002 and fully operationalised in February 2003 (IMF 
2003a, 3). In contrast to other IMF programmes, the IMF did not ask for harsh additional 
austerity: in the memoranda of understanding from June 2002 and August 2002, the target for 
the primary surplus in the budget for 2002 and 2003 was only marginally increased from 3.5 
per cent of GDP to 3.75 per cent of GDP, reflecting a minimal tightening from the 3.6 per 
cent achieved in 2001 (IMF 2002a, 2002b).9 
The case of Brazil demonstrates the difficulties of a proper assessment of a situation of 
illiquidity with a high probability of debt sustainability. Barry Eichengreen, who had served 
                                               
9 Due to a very high interest rate level for domestic public debt, the IMF agreed to base its negotiations with 
Brazil not on nominal deficit targets for the public sector, but rather on the primary result, which excludes 
interest rate payments. When considering the nominal result, which amounted to a deficit of 4-5 per cent in this 
period (see table 2), it becomes clear that overall fiscal policy remained expansive during this period. 
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as a key policy advisor to the IMF the years before, publicly argued in defence of the highly 
criticised institution: 
“Brazil in 2002 is a better gamble for the IMF than was Argentina in 2001. It 
provides the Fund an opportunity to demonstrate that it helps well-managed 
economies like Brazil while offering only tough love to delinquents like 
Argentina”, (Eichengreen 2002, 3).  
He argued that while the risk of this new credit was high, there was a greater risk of leaving 
Brazil’s financial needs unattended, ending in a situation of insolvency. Moreover, he 
suggested that this was not feasible due to geopolitical reasons: “To be sure, if the gamble is 
lost, the fallout will be severe. But sometimes it makes more sense to gamble, despite the risk 
of losing, than not to gamble at all”.  
The major part of the stand-by arrangement (24 billion USD) was only disbursed after the 
presidential elections. At the same time, the leftist candidate Lula had committed himself - as 
an informal pre-condition for the stand-by agreement - in a “Letter to the Brazilian people” to 
“respect all contracts and obligations of the country”, (Silva 2002, 3)10, despite his plans to 
change the economic model of the country. As a result, within only two months and even 
before the presidential elections, capital flows went back and the Brazilian exchange rate had 
almost recovered to its original level.11 
Insert here:  Table 2. Brazil: Selected Economic Indicators 
How the troika handled the euro crisis 
Nonetheless, not all of these experiences were taken on board when it came to the euro crisis. 
Instead, the euro crisis can be seen as an example where first Greece was given liquidity 
provision without debt restructuring even though it was clearly insolvent and subsequently 
harsh austerity was applied to countries that had first and foremost liquidity problems 
triggered by investors’ panic and market uncertainty.12 
At the onset of the euro crisis, government finances in many euro zone countries were 
strained due to the negative effects of the global economic and financial crisis of 2008/9. On 
average, the euro area had a government budget deficit of 6.3 per cent in 2009, with basically 
                                               
10 “Premissa dessa transição será naturalmente o respeito aos contratos e obrigações do país”, (Silva 2002, 3). 
11 However, the decision to restrain from a moratorium and debt restructuring had its price for Brazil. When in 
power in 2003, the new Lula government not only live up to its compromise to serve its obligations, but also 
opted for a highly orthodox economic policy to maintain capital inflows. The new government continued the 
previous pro-cyclical policies and increased the primary budget surplus even above the IMF target to 4.25 per 
cent (Ministério da Fazenda do Brasil 2003, 9), maintaining this for the next years and keeping real interest rates 
well above the 10 per cent level. As a result, the Brazilian economy entered into recession in 2003, only 
restarting growth slowly from 2004, together with the global commodity price boom. 
12 In this section, we focus on liquidity and solvency issues of the governments of the euro member states 
concerned. In typical balance-of-payment crises, usually also the private sector has liquidity problems. However, 
in the institutional context of the euro area, liquidity problems of a member states’ private sector are usually 
solved through the potential provision of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) through the national central bank 
in the European System of Central Banks and through the TARGET2 mechanism. In combination, ELA and 




all countries having broken the Maastricht treaty’s 3-percent-of-GDP threshold. Nonetheless, 
the public finance situation at that time still did not look overly concerning for most of the 
member states. Especially Ireland and Spain (which would later be labelled crisis countries) 
as well as Portugal did not show an excessively high public-debt-to-GDP level. 
 
Insert here: Table 3 
Dealing with Greece 
The euro crisis begun in earnest in early 2010 when the newly elected Greek government saw 
itself forced to revise upwards deficit and debt figures. According to updated figures, the 2009 
public deficit finally came in at more than 10 per cent of GDP. Given the already high level of 
Greek public debt of more than 120 per cent of GDP, market participants started to doubt 
Greece’s debt sustainability and yields on Greek bonds started to increase. At the beginning, 
European leaders were opposed to any rescue package for Greece, although this view started 
to change when it became clear that market concerns had started to spread to other countries, 
such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy. 
As recommended by the European Commission, Greece started implementing harsh austerity 
packages in March 2010, to the magnitude of two per cent of GDP (Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and 
Wolff 2013, 139). However, it quickly became clear that Greece would still miss its deficit 
target by a wide margin. In late April 2010, Greece requested assistance from the euro area 
member states and the IMF. By early May 2010, the troika (the IMF, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank) had put together a 110 billion EUR rescue 
package, despite warnings that Greece might have serious solvency problems that could not 
be resolved by the associated structural adjustment programmes.  
Despite the foreseen harsh budget cuts, only a relatively mild recession was assumed in the 
analysis of the Greek debt sustainability. The staff report supporting the programme assumed 
a reduction of the cyclically adjusted budget deficit from 10 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 2.4 in 
2010 and close to balance in 2011, with a resulting contraction of GDP of 4 per cent in 2010 
and 2.6 per cent in 2011 before the Greek economy would return to growth in 2012 (IMF 
2010). Even with this rather optimistic assumption, the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio was set to 
peak at around 150 per cent of GDP. Academics at that time already expressed doubts about 
these assumptions, claiming that these were unrealistically optimistic and that the debt level 
could easily climb much further (i.e. Dullien and Schwarzer 2010). 
As leaked documents by the Wall Street Journal (2013) show a number of IMF’s executive 
directors also internally voiced concerns about the programme, including the representatives 
from Argentina, Brazil and India. Furthermore, the Swiss executive director, Rene Weber, is 
quoted from a prepared statement to the board for the May 9, 2010 meeting as stating the 
following: 
“[We have] considerable doubts about the feasibility of the program. […] We 
have doubts on the growth assumptions, which seem to be overly benign. Even a 
small negative deviation from the baseline growth projections would make the 
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debt level unsustainable over the longer term […] Why has debt restructuring and 
the involvement of the private sector in the rescue package not been considered so 
far?” 
Nevertheless, the package was passed by the relevant bodies of the IMF. Yet, it failed to instil 
investors’ confidence and Greece did not regain access to financial markets. Moreover, the 
Greek economy tumbled much deeper into a recession than originally projected by the IMF 
and the troika. 
Towards the end of 2010, it became clear that the first Greek rescue package would not be 
sufficient. Hence, in 2011, discussions began about a second Greek bail-out package. At this 
point, the feeling was that rescue loans alone would not be sufficient for Greece as 
government debt was now projected to soon approach 200 per cent of GDP. Thus, the EU 
leaders agreed in October 2011 that there would be a haircut on Greek private sector creditors, 
which was implemented in 2012, roughly two years after the first provision of liquidity loans 
from the troika.  
However, the debt restructuring pushed through did not have a large effect on the debt level. 
First, official debt (against both the troika institutions and the European Central Bank, which 
had by then bought a substantial amount of Greek bonds) was excluded from the debt 
restructuring. Second, as the debt restructuring depleted the equity capital of the Greek 
banking sector, the government was forced to provide new funds for the recapitalisation of the 
banking sector. According to the IMF’s (2012a) own analysis, the Greek debt level through 
the debt restructuring was only expected to fall slightly from 165 to 160 per cent of GDP. The 
IMF staff wrote (2012a, 3–4): 
“The nature of the PSI [(private sector involvement)] operation […] with the 
scaling up of official support, […] greatly increases the rigidity of Greece debt, 
which may have a bearing on Greece’s ability to mobilize new private financing 
in large volumes and on adequate terms even after the economy stabilizes and 
economic growth has resumed. […] Greece’s external debt service burden, 
particularly on short-term maturities, has increased and remains heavy […]”. 
The IMF’s debt sustainability at that time projected the Greek debt-to-GDP level to hover 
around 160 per cent until 2014 before only dropping later (IMF 2012a, 6). According to news 
reports at the time, the IMF’s managing director, Christine Lagarde, voiced concerns towards 
the European institutions that the debt reduction was not sufficient (Financial Times 2012).13  
Nevertheless, the IMF ultimately agreed to extend the programme with the rather limited debt 
restructuring. 
At the time of writing, even this projection has proved overly optimistic. Until 2014, Greece’s 
public debt stock has risen from 130 per cent (2009) to 175 per cent of GDP, which may be a 
signal that the net debt reduction in 2012 for Greece was not sufficiently high. 
                                               
13 One might claim that the drop in bond spreads after the debt restructuring in early 2012 (see figure 1) indicates 
that markets also believed in improved debt sustainability. This interpretation is misleading as the yields are on 
different instruments: The yields prior to the restructuring are computed on the nominal value of original bonds 
(for which it had already been announced in July 2011 that they would be restructured). Hence, the drop only 
indicates that the nominal value of the bonds has been reduced. 
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It is sometimes argued that the Greek government’s lack of willingness or ability to 
implement structural reforms14 and additional revisions to past Greek data are to blame for 
the worse-than-projected debt trajectory, rather than mistakes in the initial assessment. While 
it is true that the Greek administration’s ability to implement policies has proved to be poor 
and that the government’s behaviour has probably increased political uncertainty due to a 
perceived lack of ownership of the IMF programmes and hence has hindered a recovery, it is 
questionable whether these are the most important factors. Matthes (2015) for example shows 
that until 2013, Greece had liberalized its product markets since 2008 more than any other EU 
country, that it had also been on the top of the league among EU countries in the realm of 
labour market reforms and that the degree of employment protection in Greece by 2013 had 
dropped below the euro area average, implying that “ownership” as defined by Bird/Willett 
(2004) as a low probability of implementation might not have been as serious a problem as 
often claimed. Revisions of debt-to-GDP figures happened mainly prior to the first Greek 
programme. The IMF’s initial debt-sustainability analysis of early 2010 was based on a debt-
to-GDP ratio in 2009 of 115 per cent (IMF 2010, p. 38). While this is roughly 10 percentage 
points lower than the latest available revised estimate for 2009, this gap is not enough to 
explain the problematic debt sustainability now.  
Contagion to other euro countries and diffusion of the crisis in 2012 
Soon after the first emergence of crisis signs and the provision of the first Greek rescue 
package in 2010, other euro area countries showed signs of contagion. Already in early 2010, 
spreads for other euro periphery countries rose in parallel to the yields on Greek bonds, albeit 
remaining at a lower level (figure 1). Right after the first Greek rescue package, spreads for 
other euro periphery countries fell, although they started to increase almost immediately 
again. In order to calm financial markets, the Portuguese government announced severe 
austerity measures in May 2010. With the impact of these measures, the Portuguese economy 
slid back into recession and GDP started contracting in the fourth quarter of 2010. 
Consequently, public finances further deteriorated and Portugal saw itself forced to pass new 
austerity measures, although it did not manage to calm financial markets where spreads on 
Portuguese bonds continued to increase. 
 
Insert here: Figure 1: Government Bond spreads, 10 years, against German Bunds 
 
Meanwhile, concerns about the Irish banking system (which had been in crisis since 2007) 
grew. Together with a sharp contraction in economic activity, this further rattled markets and 
spreads went up, reaching more than 360 basis points by August 2010. After the 
announcement of restructuring costs for the government of up to 50 billion EUR in September 
2010, the government saw itself forced to propose a harsh austerity in package in October 
2010 and finally applied for financial assistance from the IMF and European partners in 
December 2010. With deteriorating economic data and public finances, Portugal followed in 
April 2011. In both cases, the troika programmes included harsh austerity measures and 
                                               
14 See for example Featherstone (2011) or Visvizi (2014). 
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significant cuts in the structural budget balance in the form of expenditure cuts and tax 
increases. 
As the European treaties include a “no-bail-out clause” according to which nation states are 
responsible for their own debts, European leaders were initially reluctant to set up large, 
permanent rescue structures and the first packages were limited in volume and duration. In 
fact, it was not before the fall of 2010 that EU leaders agreed to replace the temporary EFSF 
with a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which had a lending capacity of 500 
billion EUR and was properly integrated into the European treaties.  
Nonetheless, even these steps failed to bring down spreads of European periphery bonds 
decisively. Even countries with a still relatively moderate debt-to-GDP level such as Spain 
(which had a debt-to-GDP ratio of only about 69 per cent in 2011, almost 10 percentage 
points less than Germany) saw their spreads towards German bunds further increasing, at 
some point reaching more than 500 basis points. One of the fears was that the ESM’s lending 
capacity might be too low, given its volume, should Italy or Spain require assistance. As 
Giovannini and Gros (2012) pointed out in March 2012, the programmes for the (small) 
countries of Greece, Ireland and Portugal already amounted to commitments of 490 billion 
EUR, while the (re-)financing requirements for Spain and Italy over the period of 2012 to 
2016 amounted to almost 1800 billion EUR. Consequently, the spreads on periphery bonds 
continuously climbed upwards again during the spring of 2012, again reaching more than 500 
basis points for Italy and Spain in the summer. 
At this point, the ECB’s president Mario Draghi gave a widely quoted speech in London, 
stating that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. Shortly after, the central 
bank clarified what it meant as a first step: under the term “outright monetary transactions”, it 
would be willing to buy government bonds of countries that were under an ESM programme 
and in danger of losing access to financial markets without predetermined limits. This event is 
now widely regarded as a decisive turning point in the euro crisis, as periphery bond spreads 
subsequently started to fall and have not strongly increased again to date (Schmieding 2014). 
The IMF’s ex post evaluation and its shifting positions 
There are signals - at least behind closed doors – that the IMF’s position within the troika was 
one of more flexibility regarding the mix of debt restructuring and adjustment policies (see 
i.e. the European Parliament Report, 2014). In this sense, the IMF’s internal position reflects 
the shift already realised by Lütz and Kranke (2014), which testify the IMF’s greater 
flexibility in comparison to European bodies in terms of tackling financial crises in borrowing 
members such as the Eastern European countries even before the Greek crisis. The IMF 
certainly transferred to the euro institutions substantial knowledge how to implement liquidity 
programmes. The euro institutions also could gain increasing knowledge in the understanding 
of the nature of the euro crisis.  
 
“Finance ministers debating in the Eurogroup and high-ranking officials preparing 
the meetings increasingly acknowledged that changing market expectations 
themselves can create crises if they take on the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
[…]. The insight derived from ‘multiple equilibrium’ models, which the ECB and 
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the IMF as well as a number of academics and thinktankers used to explain the 
development of the crisis”, (Schwarzer 2015, 18). 
 
Yet, we argue that this transfer of knowledge was limited. According to the experiences that 
the IMF had gained in the Latin American crises, Greece should never have received support 
without a debt restructuring and at least some of the other countries in the euro area should 
not have been burdened with the harsh austerity for which they were asked. Instead, the kind 
of liquidity provision as supported by the ECB from 2012 onwards should have been the 
response from the beginning. 
In either case, the IMF loosened its standards during the euro crisis. Rather early in the 
negotiations on the Greek debt crisis, the IMF correctly identified this as a case of insolvency. 
In 2010, the country’s debt was already classified as “not to be sustainable with high 
probability”, (see IMF 2013a, 18).  
“The Fund approved an exceptionally large loan to Greece under an SBA in May 
2010 despite having considerable misgivings about Greece’s debt sustainability 
(…). The decision required the Fund to depart from its established rules on 
exceptional access. (…) The euro partners had ruled out debt restructuring and 
were unwilling to provide additional financing assurances”, (IMF 2013a, 32).  
Despite this, the IMF agreed with its European troika partners to provide liquidity to Greece. 
In order to make this step compatible with its own regulation, the Fund consequently changed 
the EAP in 2010.  
“The chosen course was therefore to amend the policy to create an exception to 
the requirement of ‘high probability’ in circumstances where ‘there is a high risk 
of international systemic spill-overs. Eventually, the planned adjustment proved 
unfeasible and, despite additional official sector financing on supportive terms, 
private debt restructuring became unavoidable and was launched in February 
2012’”, (IMF 2013b, 20). 
With this exception for the lending for Greece despite serious doubts of its fiscal solvency, the 
IMF clearly contradicted its own approaches, which were redesigned after having managed 
emerging market crises and translated in rather clear-cut frameworks. The IMF itself explains 
its behaviour with a multiple set of interests in borrower and creditor countries to delay a 
restructuring of unsustainable debt.  
“Authorities are also concerned about a restructuring’s impact on market re-access 
and spill-over effects on the private sector. In addition, official creditors have 
sometimes contributed to delays, out of concern that a restructuring would reduce 
incentives for the debtor country to adjust, force banks located in official lenders’ 
countries to recognize losses, and trigger market turmoil affecting similarly-
situated countries, or to preserve flexibility for the future. Private creditors will 
also naturally wish to avoid a debt restructuring if at all possible, and will 
therefore press for a bail-out by the official sector”, (IMF 2013b, 21). 
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At the same time, the IMF clearly acknowledges that liquidity provision in a case of 
insolvency is much more costly than a direct debt restructuring effort: “[…] when a debt 
restructuring is the only option to deal with a liquidity shock or to restore solvency, e.g. in 
situations where available financing and policy adjustment have been exhausted, delays end 
up amplifying the ultimate costs”, (IMF 2013b, 20–21). As the IMF has always been repaid, 
these “ultimate costs” can only refer to adjustment costs and lost output in the respective 
country. 
It was only later that the IMF discussed a new framework (IMF 2013b, 2014) to address cases 
of illiquidity and insolvency, and redeemed the exceptions made in 2010 for the case of 
Greece. In addition to this, a third option besides the classification of liquidity and insolvency 
crises has been introduced for cases that cannot be clearly classified as one or the other. In 
such cases, a country shall be offered a prolongation of maturities rather than liquidity or debt 
restructuring. In case of a successful so-called re-profiling, the Fund argues that the creditor’s 
loss is less than in the case of a restructuring. In case the crisis worsens, a restructuring shall 
be conducted. Nonetheless, both the concept of multiple equilibria as well as the IMF’s own 
experience in Argentina and Greece show that such a workaround is associated with much 
higher costs and a prolonged crisis if a prolongation of maturities does not succeed. The 
subsequent restructuring is much more costly for both sides and possibly enables creditors 
delaying the restructuring altogether. 
When it comes to the volume of liquidity provisions to other euro area countries beyond 
Greece, which has long been argued to be insufficient, there are some indications that the IMF 
was aware that more liquidity might be needed. Indeed, in its September 2011 World 
Economic Outlook (IMF 2011, 19), about ten months before Mario Draghi’s speech, the IMF 
stated:  
“[The challenge is to send] a clear signal that euro area members will continue to 
do whatever it takes to preserve confidence in the euro. In the meantime, the ECB 
will need to continue to intervene forcefully (with suitable sovereign safeguards) 
to support orderly markets in sovereign debt.” 
On July 18, 2012, about a week before Draghi’s speech, Mahmood Pradhan, Deputy Director 
of the IMF’s European Department and mission chief for the euro area, was quoted in the IMF 
Survey online with the plea (IMF 2012b): 
“The European Central Bank should, in our view, consider more unconventional 
measures (for instance, quantitative easing) to support financial markets in 
countries undergoing severe stress.” 
Here, it seems that while being constrained by its own limitations of lending, the IMF was 
desperately trying to push the troika partners towards providing more liquidity by ways 
beyond the established lending programmes.15 
                                               
15 Another interpretation of the IMF’s pledge for debt reduction would be that, being involved as creditor but 




Against the above-described theoretical background of multiple equilibria models that require 
a differentiated treatment of debt crises depending on the debtor’s state of solvency, the chain 
of events in the euro crisis is rather straightforward to interpret: in Greece, there seems to 
have been a problem of unsustainable debt levels at the onset of the crisis. Ideally, such 
situation would have required an immediate and sufficient debt restructuring and some 
corrective fiscal measures. A correct distinction between illiquidity and insolvency and 
corresponding behaviour by the troika could have avoided costly delay. In fact, the liquidity 
provisions by the troika have only succeeded in delaying the debt restructuring and potentially 
increasing its costs. In the rest of the euro area, an important element seems to have been 
liquidity rather than solvency problems, as evidenced by the fact that the panic subsided when 
unlimited liquidity provision through the ECB and the ESM was announced. Here, the 
problem seems to be that the volume of possible liquidity assistance probably was insufficient 
in volume until Mario Draghi’s announcement. As the models on multiple equilibria describe, 
only a sufficient amount of liquidity being credibly made available will be sufficient to 
stabilise expectations in the non-default (“good”) equilibrium. By contrast, an insufficient 
amount of liquidity will not be able to shift expectations and a country will remain in the 
default equilibrium. The longer that liquidity provision is delayed, the more likely a default 
becomes, as the high interest rates deteriorate the underlying solvency position of the country 
in question. 
These theoretical lessons, together with practical and painful experience gained in tackling 
emerging markets’ debt crises, had been included into the IMF’s framework. One can thus say 
that the Europeans’ hopes that they could benefit from several decades of IMF crisis 
management experience have only been partially fulfilled, and with large and costly delays. In 
particular, fundamental insights in the design of assistance packages have been neglected, 
despite evidence that the IMF staff was well aware that the design of the euro zone troika 
programmes was against better institutional knowledge. As the policy choices taken against 
the IMF’s experiences have arguably contributed to the depth and duration of the euro crisis, 
this failure is a serious shortcoming of the troika setup. Accordingly, we confirm the finding 
of Ban and Gallagher (2015) that these changes are rather slow and uneven. 
Yet, one should be careful to put the blame for this on the IMF alone: The IMF was not 
entirely free in making its decision to join or not to join the programme in 2010. There were 
serious concerns among European policy makers that a debt restructuring for Greece would 
lead to contagion to other euro area countries (IMF 2013a, p. 8). EU countries as major 
shareholders had a disproportionate weight in IMF decision making. While this helps us 
understand why the IMF acted as it did, it does not change the fact that the outcome was a 
suboptimal adjustment package with significant costs. Later in the crisis, the lack of 
dynamism in Greece to overhaul its public administration certainly reduced the political will 
of the other Euro member countries to offer substantial debt release, as they feared to produce 
a moral hazard effect on other debtor countries, regardless the fact that Greece was 
undertaking substantial labour market and trade related reforms.  
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This prompts a number of questions for future research. One important question would be 
why the IMF did not push more to apply new approaches that were set up after experiences in 
emerging markets in the euro crisis. Was it because it was only a “junior partner” in the troika 
programmes, with the larger share of the funds disbursed coming from European sources? 
Alternatively, was it due to the political economy of the IMF’s governance structures and the 
fact that EU countries are among the most important shareholders of the Fund? These sorts of 
questions would require insights into formal and informal decision-making processes within 
the IMF, the troika and the relevant governments involved, which exceeds the scope of this 
paper. 
Depending on the answers to these questions, important policy conclusions could be drawn 
about the future setup of assistance programmes and the IMF. If it was the Europeans’ 
influence in the Fund that led to these sub-optimal policy designs, this would call for reforms 
in the IMF’s governance structure. If it was rather owing to the undue influence of the senior 
partners in the troika, then the IMF should think about refraining from such joint assistance 
programmes. 
Nonetheless, what we can conclude upon is that based on its own and institutionally 
accumulated and formalised knowledge, the IMF could have performed better in helping the 
euro members to tackle this crisis, which most probably would have made a difference. 
Returning to the introductory statement of a former ECB director concerning the role assigned 
to the IMF within the troika, one might say that the IMF performed better regarding the 
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Table 1. Argentina: Selected Economic Indicators 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
GDP growth (annual %) (1) 3,85 -3,39 -0,79 -4,41 
-
10,89 8,84 9,03 







General government net debt (% of GDP) 
(2) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
General government gross debt (% of 
GDP) (2) 31,87 36,30 38,08 44,76 137,72 116,39 106,03 
General gov. structural balance (% of 
potential GDP) (2) -1,93 -2,57 -2,41 -3,15 0,21 1,91 3,53 
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, 
period average) (1) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 3,06 2,90 2,92 
Real interest rate (%) (1) 12,55 13,12 9,95 29,12 16,18 7,83 -1,06 
Inflation, average consumer prices (% 
change) (2) 0,93 -1,17 -0,94 -1,07 25,87 13,44 4,42 
Current account balance (% of GDP) (2) -4,04 -3,50 -2,63 -1,17 7,25 5,29 1,69 
Source: (1) World Development Indicators, 2013; (2) World Economic Outlook, April 2016. 
Table 2. Brazil: Selected Economic Indicators 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth (annual %) (1) 0,26 4,31 1,31 2,66 1,15 5,71 3,16 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) (1) 43,15 38,68 43,04 47,68 44,13 34,28 21,98 
Internal public net debt 5 (% of GDP) (2) 35,16 36,54 38,85 37,48 41,66 40,18 44,13 
External public net debt 3 (% of GDP) (2) 9,38 9,00 9,59 12,99 10,69 6,82 2,33 
General government net debt (% of GDP) 
(3) 41,76 42,83 47,54 49,24 51,67 47,21 46,83 
General government gross debt (% of 
GDP) (3) 53,54 60,31 64,93 64,89 70,44 65,41 67,38 
General government net debt (% of GDP) 
(4) n/a 47,00 51,49 59,93 54,26 50,19 47,92 
General government gross debt (% of 
GDP) (4) n/a 65,56 70,05 78,80 73,82 70,08 68,59 
Overall fiscal result (4) 
      primary  
















SELIC rate (% p.y., end of year) (3)  19,04 15,84 19,05 24,90 16,33 17,75 18,04 
Inflation, average consumer prices (% 
change) (2) 4,86 7,04 6,84 8,45 14,71 6,60 6,87 








1,509 0,756 1,76 1,585 
Source: (1) World Development Indicators, 2013; (2) Ipea Data, 2014; (3) Banco Central do Brasil, 2014; (4) 





 Current account 
balance in % of GDP 
Public sector balance in 
% of GDP 
Public debt in % of 
GDP 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Euro area (12 countries) -0.5 0,4 0,5 -2,2 -6,2 -6,2 69 79 85 
Belgium 1.4 1,0 3,6 -1,1 -5,4 -4,0 93 100 100 
Germany 5.6 5,9 5,7 -0,2 -3,2 -4,2 65 72 81 
Ireland -5.8 -4,1 -0,8 -7,0 -13,8 -32,3 42 62 87 
Greece -15.8 -12,5 -11,3 -10,2 -15,2 -11,2 109 127 146 
Spain -9.2 -4,3 -3,9 -4,4 -11,0 -9,4 39 53 60 
France -1.4 -1,6 -1,7 -3,2 -7,2 -6,8 68 79 82 
Italy -2.9 -1,9 -3,5 -2,7 -5,3 -4,2 102 113 115 
Cyprus -15.6 -7,7 -10,7 0,9 -5,5 -4,8 45 54 56 
Luxembourg 7.7 7,3 6,8 3,4 -0,7 -0,7 15 16 20 
Malta -1.1 -6,6 -4,7 -4,2 -3,3 -3,2 63 68 68 
Netherlands 5.2 6,2 7,7 0,2 -5,4 -5,0 54 56 59 
Austria 4.1 2,1 3,1 -1,4 -5,3 -4,4 69 80 82 
Portugal -12.6 -10,1 -10,3 -3,8 -9,8 -11,2 72 84 96 
Finland 2.7 2,0 1,4 4,2 -2,5 -2,6 33 42 47 
United Kingdom -3.6 -3,0 -2,8 -5,0 -10,7 -9,6 52 66 77 
United States -4.7 -2,6 -3,0 -7,0 -12,7 -12,0 73 86 95 
Japan 3.3 2,9 3,8 -1,9 -8,8 -8,3 192 210 216 
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